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  This study tests whether establishments with decentralized decision-making, information-
sharing programs, or incentive pay plans are significantly more likely to innovate than other 
establishments.  There is reason to think this is the case.  Workers who directly interact with 
customers have information about consumer preferences and constraints that managers do not 
have.  This information may be important to spawning new product ideas.  Similarly, workers who 
are part of the production process will know about the weaknesses and inefficiencies of the 
process; this information can generate innovative improvements to the process. If the worker with 
this private information also has the capacity to act on the information or to share the information 
with someone who has such capacity, subsequent innovations are more likely.  There are costly 
tradeoffs however -- organizations that allow workers such authority will be subject to more 
internal uncertainty and surprises, and to more principal-agent problems. 
  Freeman and Lazear (1995), in their theory on works councils, point to information-
sharing as a solution to this dilemma.  Management and workers have different information sets 
and can therefore increase the organization’s productive efficiency by adopting institutions that 
increase the transmission of information.  The result may be that “management and labor together 
discover solutions to company problems that neither would have conceived separately” (p44).  
While information-sharing can be the right solution for some establishments, it can impose costs 
of setting up an information infrastructure and costs of delay while the information is transferred 
and interpreted.  These costs can be severe if it is necessary to react quickly to the environment.   
  Under rapidly changing circumstances, transferring information from the worker to another 
decision-maker is more costly.  This may encourage decentralization, giving workers more 
authority to act autonomously.  For example, a firm may have to redefine its product frequently, 
change technologies in its design and production, or adapt its marketing to changing 
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circumstances.  Partly for these reasons, high tech firms are thought to have more inclusive 
decision-making processes.  Decentralization comes at a cost, however.  If workers are given the 
authority to make decisions on the basis of private information, the organization will likely incur 
agency costs.  As Jensen and Meckling (1995) describe, “[b]ecause they are ultimately self-
interested, the agents to whom the CEO delegates authority have objective functions that diverge 
from his or her own” (p.17).  This means that the establishment faces a trade-off between the 
agency costs it faces under decentralization, and the infrastructure and time costs of information 
sharing.  Any combination of these two approaches could support product and process innovation. 
  The empirical literature on innovation presents some results consistent with these 
hypotheses.  A number of studies show that various inclusive and interactive work processes 
increase productivity (see Black and Lynch, 2004; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002, or 
Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1997 for excellent examples).  There are far fewer articles 
linking workplace organization to innovation.  Typically, large nationally representative surveys 
lack either a direct measure of innovation or detailed information about work organization.  
Michie and Sheehan (1999) use two proxies for innovation to link human resources practices with 
innovation in a large data set of UK firms.  Laursen and Foss (2003) show an association between 
a variety of human resource practices to innovation in data from 1,900 Danish firms, and Rogers 
(1999) uses a panel of 698 Australian workplaces to show that better employee-management 
communications systematically increase reported innovations.  Therrien and Léonard (2003) use 
the first wave of the data set used here to show that particular forms of enrichment practices affect 
the innovative nature of the establishment. 
  The contributions of this paper differ from this prior literature on workplace and 
innovation.  First, our data, which include over 19,000 observations spanning a period of four 
years, are more extensive than those used in prior research in this area.  Second, much of the 
existing work follows Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) in focusing on the 
  2   
complementarities in human resource management techniques.  One implication, supported by 
Michie and Sheehan (1999) and Therrien and Léonard (2003), is that the more types of workplace 
practices used, the greater the rate of innovation.  Our approach presupposes a certain degree of 
complementarity, but also tries to identify tradeoffs in the sense that different groups of workplace 
practices imply different avenues through which firms can foster innovation.  Finally, taking 
advantage of the panel aspect of our data, we control for the potential endogeneity of the 
workplace practices. 
  The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections.  In Section II, a descriptive model 
highlights how either information sharing or decentralized decision rights might increase 
innovation.  Section III describes the data, measures of decentralization and information-sharing 
and an empirical strategy.  Section IV presents results, and section V concludes. 
 
II. Theories of organization 
  We develop a descriptive model, inspired in part by the intuition of Jensen and Meckling 
(1995), to highlight how organizational structures might foster the use of workers’ knowledge to 
make useful innovations.  As Mookherjee (2006) points out, existing formal models do not 
provide a complete theory of decision rights that integrates information processing or 
communication costs with incentive considerations.  This descriptive framework therefore 
provides intuition and insights into the trade-off between centralization and decentralization.  
Imagine that an establishment’s founders choose its organizational structure to maximize future 
profits, taking into account a link between work organization and expected returns from 
innovations.  Many factors, such as industry, uncertainty of the market, speed of market change, 
and the nature of inputs, affect whether such profitable innovations are likely in any particular 
establishment.  The founder has ex ante estimates of the probabilities that workers and managers 
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possess private information relevant to conceiving of and implementing innovations, and the 
probability that innovations with positive expected returns will be found.   
  The model assumes that the risk-neutral founders have three choices available for 
increasing the expected benefits of innovation: decentralized decision making, information 
sharing, and the use of incentive pay.  These three variables are summarized by nonnegative 
measures  d,  s  and  p.  Decentralized decision making and information sharing enable the active 
use of more private information held by the establishment’s workers.  Incentive pay does not 
directly lead to the transfer of private information, but reduces the costs of decentralization or 
information sharing by aligning incentives.  The expected number of future innovations is a 
nonnegative function  i(d,s) which is increasing in each of its arguments.  Letting the average net 
expected benefit of each adopted innovation be  bi,  the overall net expected benefits of innovation 
from these organizational choices are  bi*i(d,s).  Costs associated with innovation that are 
independent of workplace organization are subsumed in  bi. 
  We assume that decentralization has costs,  cd(d,p),  which include the possible losses from 
decisions with mutually inconsistent objectives, the costs of monitoring workers, and the 
opportunities lost because the establishment is less able to coordinate decisions at a higher level 
where information could be pooled.  There are also costs to transferring information, which we 
denote  cs(d,p).  These include the costs of setting up and operating information infrastructure, 
including suggestion programs and problem-solving committees, and the indirect costs that are a 
function of the delay in transferring information.  Incentive pay plays a special role in the model.  
It does not directly affect innovation, but instead mitigates the costs of the other two forms of 
work organization.  Incentive pay encourages workers to make decisions consistent with the 
founders’ goals, reducing  cd,  and motivates workers to identify and share useful information, 
reducing  cs.  We denote operational and other costs of incentive pay systems by cp(p).  The 
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founders choose an organizational structure  (d, s, p)  to maximize the expected net benefits of 
future innovations: 
 
) ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( : max , , p c p s c p d c s d i b p s d i p s d − − −  (1) 
 
  Since the empirical section focuses on discrete measures of the three variables, corner 
solutions--where the founder chooses not to use some aspect of work organization--are 
particularly relevant.  For example, if the benefits of both information sharing and 
decentralization are small (the first derivatives,  is  and  id,  are always close to zero) or the costs 
of these work organization practices are high, then the founder will choose a centralized 
workplace, where  d = s = 0.  Such a centralized workplace can nonetheless be consistent with 
innovation (if  bi>0  and  i(d,s)  has a positive intercept),  or the presence of a centralized 
workplace might indicate that the founder does not pursue innovation  (if  bi<0).   
The model also allows for the possibility that the founder chooses to use either  d,  or  s,  or 
both.  One such case occurs when workers hold information that can lead to innovations, but the 
costs to communicating this information hierarchically exceed the agency costs of empowering 
workers.  This could happen if the information were tacit (hard to communicate or identify) or if 
the economic environment were to require firms to react quickly.
1  In such situations, firms might 
optimally allocate decision making about technology and work processes to the workers.  A 
second possibility is that workers have production-specific information that can quickly and 
easily be communicated.  In this case the marginal impact of information sharing,  is,  might be 
relatively large.  Here, labor-management committees and other formal programs that encourage 
information sharing, suggestions and feedback may support innovation.  If complementarities 
                                                 
1 Some examples illustrate the scenario.  E-commerce has changing technologies and markets.  Changing fashions can 
affect what the market wants.  Difficulty or delay in computation or processing by decision makers introduces costs 
similar to difficulty or delay in communication; see Van Zandt (2003) for a model of this. 
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between  d  and  s  exist, the founder may choose to use both.  The founder may offset some of 
the costs of these forms of work organization through the use of incentive pay.  
  This descriptive model allows us to classify combinations of work organization practices, 
highlights implicit assumptions, and points towards some hypotheses which provide a framework 
for prediction.  For example, the model discounts reasons other than innovation that managers 
would decentralize or share information.
2  The model also assumes a direction of causality so that 
innovations depend on work organization; in the empirical section we test the alternative 
hypothesis that innovations predict structure.
3  In terms of providing a framework for prediction, 
the model suggests that decentralization and information-sharing should both be positively 
associated with innovations.  While fully centralized firms may also innovate, they do so only if  
bi>0,  a more restrictive criteria than those faced by other firms.  Thus, we expect that fully 
centralized firms should be negatively associated with innovations relative to decentralized ones.   
  Decentralization and information sharing can be either complements or substitutes.  If 
information sharing improves the decision-making capacity of managers, it will reduce the 
benefits of decentralization.  On the other hand, bottom-up information sharing makes monitoring 
easier and thus more closely aligns worker’s objectives to the firm, reducing the agency costs of 
decentralization.  Additionally, top-down information sharing allows decentralized workers to 
make better decisions.  The empirical section will examine these paths by including interaction 
terms between the three types of workplace innovation. 
While any result on the interaction terms between decentralization and information sharing 
might be consistent with the model, the model has clear predictions about the interaction between 
                                                 
2 Mohr and Zoghi (2006) show that decentralized workplaces have higher worker satisfaction, so firms may use 
decentralization to motivate workers rather than specifically to foster innovation.  Freeman and Lazear (1995) explore 
the hypothesis that information sharing is used to transmit bad news and thereby induce effort.  Black and Lynch 
(2001) and others consider the possibility that decentralization affects productivity directly. 
3 Therrien and Léonard (2003) offer a nice counterexample of a firm that adopts a new machine that may temporarily 
slow production and cause the firm to operate at less than full capacity.  Managers might introduce special human 
resource practices, such as training or problem-solving teams to minimize the delay. 
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incentive pay and the other two variables.  It implies that incentive pay increases the effect of both 
decentralization and information sharing on innovation.  In decentralized workplaces, incentive 
pay motivates workers to seek out profitable innovations.  While information-sharing alone should 
result in innovation (since the decision-maker is assumed to have profit-maximizing objectives), 
we expect the effect to be strengthened if the bottom-up information sharing is accompanied by 
individual or group incentive pay, which  motivates workers to identify and share useful 
information.  Finally, the model suggests that incentive pay, absent information sharing or 
decentralization, should have little impact on innovation.  Incentive pay at a centralized firm does 
not change the underlying problem: the worker might have the knowledge necessary to make 
improvements but not the authority to act on it, and vice versa. 
 
III. Empirical strategy and data description 
 
  A probit model describes the hypothesized relationship between the organizational 
structure of the workplace and its innovativeness: 
 
Prob(innovjt = 1) = Φ(α + β1dj + β2sj + β3pj + β4(djpj) + β5(pjsj) + β6(djsj) + β7(djpjsj) + γZjt + εjt)  (2) 
 
where  innovjt  is an indicator for whether establishment  j  introduced an innovation in year  t,  and  
dj,  sj,  and  pj  are indicators for whether establishment j used decentralized decision-making, 
information-sharing, or incentive pay, respectively, in the initial year.  The model includes 
interaction terms for the joint use of these organizational features.  The descriptive model suggests 
that the coefficients on decentralization and information sharing  (β1  and  β2)  will be positive,  the 
coefficient on incentive pay alone  (β3)  will be zero,  the interactions between incentive pay and 
the other two forms of work organization (β4  and  β5) will be positive, and that the remaining 
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interaction terms (β6  and  β7)  may be either positive or negative.  Finally,  Zjt  includes other 
variables that are likely to affect the innovativeness of an establishment.   
  This project uses data on 6,322 establishments drawn from the 1999-2003 Canadian 
Workplace and Employee Survey (WES).  Establishments were first selected from all employers 
in Canada with paid employees, except for those in the Yukon, Nunavut, and Northwest 
Territories and those in farming, fishing and trapping, religious organizations and public 
administration.  These establishments were then re-surveyed annually for five years, the first four 
of which are currently available for analysis.  In 1999, 6322 workplaces were interviewed, with 
data collected through personal interviews.
4  In the succeeding years, responses were acquired 
from 6068, 6223, and 5818 of these establishments, using computer-assisted telephone interviews.  
Questions about workplace practices were asked only in 1999 and 2001 and only of 
establishments with more than 10 employees.  Smaller establishments are dropped from our 
sample.   
The survey asks respondents whether the workplace has introduced any of four specific 
types of innovations in the preceding year: 1) new goods or services, which “differ significantly in 
character or intended use from previously produced goods or services,” 2) improved goods or 
services, which “are those whose performance has been significantly enhanced or upgraded,” 3) 
new processes, which “include the adoption of new methods of goods production or service 
delivery,” and 4) improved processes, which “are those whose performance has been significantly 
enhanced or upgraded.”  Table 1 shows the share of establishments that report introducing an 
innovation in the past year.
5  In three of the four years, the majority of establishments introduced 
some kind of innovation.  Product innovations were more common than process innovations, and 
                                                 
4 While the primary contact is typically a human resources person, in about 20% of the surveyed establishments, other 
respondents also answer some questions. 
5 All means reported here have been probability-weighted to adjust for the sampling framework and to protect the 
confidentiality of respondents. 
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more establishments reported improvements to existing products and processes than entirely new 
ones. Innovation rates of all kinds were highest in 1999 and lowest in 2002. 
The survey also elicits detailed information about work organization, including the use of 
quality circles, teams, suggestion programs, feedback, self directed work and the use of incentive 
pay programs.  It records who (workers, management or some combined team) participates in 
decisions over twelve different aspects of the production process, including planning of individual 
work, purchase of machinery, staffing levels, and new product development.  The level of detail in 
the information about both innovation and work organization makes the WES data set unique. 
  Consistent with the theory explored in the previous section, we classify firms according to 
the allocation of decision authority, the use of information-sharing techniques, and incentive pay 
programs.  We start with decision-making.  We count the number of decisions that workers 
participate in making, and categorize those establishments that delegate two or more decisions (out 
of the twelve possible) as decentralized establishments.
6  Since these questions are asked twice of 
establishments, once in 1999 and again in 2001, an establishment could change organizational 
structure over time.  In most estimations we include only an establishment’s 1999 organizational 
structure.  Using the 2001 structure or a combination yields similar results. 
Apart from decision-making, flows of communication between workers and management 
can support innovation.  The WES gathers information about three workplace characteristics that 
indicate such inclusiveness: 1) employee suggestion programs, including employee survey 
feedback, 2) information sharing programs, “for example with response to firm’s performance, 
colleagues’ wages, technological or organizational change, etc.”, and 3) joint labor-management 
committees, which include “non-legislated joint labour-management committees and task teams 
that generally cover a broad range of issues, yet tend to be consultative in nature.”  These 
                                                 
6 Thirty-five percent of establishments were decentralized by this definition, because they delegated two or more types 
of decisions to workers or workgroups.  An alternative measure of decentralization would be how high in a hierarchy 
decision problems go to be resolved, as suggested by Clawson (1980, pp. 84-85).   
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workplace characteristics seek to transfer information and get employee input without necessarily 
ceding the decision rights.  We define an establishment to employ information-sharing if it has at 
least two of these three programs existing on a formal basis in the workplace.   
Finally, the survey includes indicators for the existence of an individual incentive pay plan, 
group incentive pay, or a profit-sharing plan for non-managerial employees at the workplace.  We 
estimate the effects of each.  When estimating interactions with the other two work organization 
variables, we use individual incentive pay.   
  Other factors that may affect the probability of innovation are included in  Zjt,  and the 
means of these variables are listed in Table 2.  The size of the establishment, measured by the 
natural log of the number of employees, should be positively related to innovation, since there 
may be more product lines and services that are open to efficiency and quality improvements.  
Establishment age may affect innovation in that older institutions may have already invested in 
determining their internal structure.  Their core technologies and ways of organizing have survived 
a longer-term selection process, so they may therefore be less likely to innovate.  A strong union 
presence can increase resistance to process changes or reduce the share of rents from innovation 
that are captured by the establishment.  Both would reduce the incentive to innovate.
7  Employees 
in  professional, technical, or managerial positions are more likely to possess valuable information 
that can be used to innovate. The model also includes a control variable for whether the 
establishment is part of a multi-plant firm, as well as industry and year indicators. 
Two variables capture the volatility of the market: an indicator for whether the 
establishment experiences seasonal peaks in demand, and the vacancy rate (the number of 
vacancies as a fraction of total employment).  Both may predict innovation.  The establishment 
may innovate in response to fluctuations in either the input or output markets, and seasonal ebbs 
                                                 
7 Hirsch and Link (1987) find that R&D spending is lower in unionized firms and Acs and Audretsch (1988) find that 
highly unionized industries produce fewer innovations. 
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may provide opportunities to focus on redesigning products or production processes.  To measure 
competition, we include indicators for whether the establishment is a monopoly, whether it faces 
significant competition (more than twenty competitors), and if it has non-profit status.  Aghion et 
al. (2005) and Parente and Prescott (1999) theorize that monopolies are less likely to innovate, but 
recognize Schumpeterian-type arguments going the other way.  For example, some monopolies 
exist because the monopolist previously innovated, and may remain the type to innovate further.  
Monopolies may also be able to benefit uniquely from competence-enhancing innovations and 
therefore have a particular incentive to innovate (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). 
  Table 3a indicates how innovativeness varies across industry, measuring the share of 
establishments that had any of the four types of innovations in 1999.  Establishments in finance 
and insurance and capital-intensive (often high tech) manufacturing reported innovations more 
often than establishments in other industries did.  Also especially innovative were information and 
cultural industries, and labor-intensive tertiary manufacturing, which includes firms with many 
product lines, or firms that respond quickly to changes in consumer demand.  A probit estimation 
of the probability of innovation on the industrial classification, shown in Appendix Table A2, 
confirms that these four industries are associated with the highest marginal increase in probability 
of innovation.  Industries reporting the fewest innovations were forestry, mining, oil and gas 
extraction, education and health services, communications and other utilities. 
  Table 3b details innovativeness across values of the other explanatory variables in Zjt.  It 
suggests that the three workplace organization variables are correlated with higher innovation.  
Establishments that decentralize decision making, share information, or offer incentive pay plans 
innovate much more than those that do not do any of these.
8  Additionally, larger establishments, 
unionized establishments, those with seasonal demand peaks, and those with high vacancy rates, 
                                                 
8 Appendix Table A1 shows innovation rates by the individual workplace practices that comprise these organizational 
types.  No single component appears to dominate this result. 
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have higher innovation rates than the average establishment.  Monopolies have a strikingly low 
rate of innovation.  We now turn to our regression approach to determine whether these 




  The first three columns of Table 4 report marginal effects of the probit estimation 
described in equation (2), using three alternative measures of the dependent variable: whether the 
establishment introduced a new or improved product, whether it introduced a new or improved 
process, and whether it introduced any innovation in the past year.  The fourth column uses a 
Tobit estimator to measure the effect of the independent variables on the number of these four 
innovation types an establishment introduced in the past year.  We treat this count as a rough 
ranking of innovativeness.  These show how the predictors affect the number of types of 
innovations—they are not comparable in magnitude, nor necessarily in sign, to the first three 
columns, which measure how the predictors affect the probability of having one or any innovation.  
All columns use the pooled 1999-2002 sample and standard errors are corrected both for sample 
design and for heteroskedasticity due to multiple observations per establishment.  
Decentralized decision making and information sharing are both strongly correlated with 
innovation.  Establishments that employ one of these forms of workplace organization are 14-22% 
more likely to have an innovation than the excluded group (centralized establishments without 
information-sharing or individual incentive pay programs).  The use of incentive pay programs is 
also positively related to innovation, but the effect is small and statistically insignificant in three 
estimations.  All of these results are consistent with the descriptive model, which predicts that 
information sharing and decentralization will both positively affect innovation, but that incentive 
pay will not foster innovation directly.  The result that the marginal effect of information sharing 
is consistently larger than the marginal effect of decentralization is a significant new finding.   
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The negative coefficients on the interaction between decentralization and information 
sharing suggests that the two organizational structures are more likely substitutes than 
complements, although the effects are only statistically significant in the Tobit estimation.  The 
consistently negative coefficient on the interaction between decision rights and incentive pay is 
contrary to the implications of our theory.  The result may reflect a resistance by workers on some 
forms of incentive pay to implement change.  Freeman and Kleiner (2005), studying production 
workers in shoe manufacturing who are paid on piece rates, argue that these workers might be 
particularly resistant to change.  Innovation in technology or the production process may require 
workers to be assigned to new jobs, or learn new tasks.  Such changes could cause a temporary 
decrease in the individual worker’s output and therefore pay.
9
  Other establishment characteristics are also correlated with innovation.  Larger 
establishments are more likely to innovate, presumably because they have more activities of any 
kind, including those which can be improved or leveraged to larger scale.  Stronger union presence 
does not appear to be correlated with the probability of any particular innovation, although it is 
negatively related to the number of types of innovation an establishment reports.  Nonprofit 
institutions are less likely to generate innovations than comparable for-profit institutions.  A high 
vacancy rate is strongly correlated with innovation as predicted; these may be establishments in 
opportunistic, turbulent circumstances. 
The findings in table 4 provide evidence that decentralization and information-sharing 
practices predict higher innovation rates.  They may not cause the higher innovation rates, 
however.  First, causality might go in the opposite direction -- innovation may spur workplace 
reorganization. Second, both outcomes may be caused by omitted variables.  For example, it may 
be that college-educated managers spot potential innovations and that educated managers also 
                                                 
9 Other plausible explanations might also account for these results, however.  For example a survey instrument only 
captures the presence of formal programs.  Information sharing in particular might often be done informally at 
establishments that decentralize decision rights.  This would bias both the coefficient on information sharing and on 
the interaction term. 
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share information or grant decision rights.  In this case, since manager education is unobserved, 
our results for the other variables would be biased relative to the structural relationship.  
We investigate the first of these issues by testing for causality going the other direction.  
Table 5 reports the results of three probit estimations on the probability of an establishment 
granting decision rights, using information sharing programs or using an incentive pay scheme in 
2001.  We include most of the regressors in Table 4, along with measures of the number of 
innovations of any kind in each year of the sample.  If past innovations are correlated with the 
workplace organization, but later ones are not, then we have evidence of a “reverse causality” 
problem.  Results of this estimation do indicate the possibility that innovations lead to workplace 
organization, in particular for the adoption of information sharing and incentive pay plans, which 
are correlated with the one year lagged innovations.  This is a short term phenomenon and difficult 
to pin down accurately since the observed annual variation depends on when an innovation is 
reported.  For example, an establishment may commit to making a new product before the 
innovation is recognized by the survey respondent, or it may be recognized by the respondent 
before it is finished.  The fact that there aren’t correlations of the same kind at a two year lag 
suggests we do not have long term reverse causality. 
We take additional steps to control for the potential endogeneity of the regressors.  One 
way to remove some of this endogeneity is to restrict the analysis to the pooled 2000-2002 sample, 
and use the lagged 1999 variables as regressors.  This specification gives up some information 
about the current year that might affect innovation outcomes in order to reduce short run 
endogeneity.  Consider, for example, the vacancy rate.  Innovative establishments are likely to 
expand by hiring, which implies that both the vacancy rate and the innovation rate is informative 
about the firm’s type, but vacancy is not the cause of innovation.  A lagged variable, like the 
previous vacancy rate is likely to tell us about the firm’s type and its environment historically, 
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without being a short-run result of recent innovative outcomes.  It is less endogenous than current-
year vacancy rates. 
Table 6 shows the results of these estimations.  The results for the workplace organization 
variables are qualitatively similar to those in Table 4.  Information-sharing programs and 
decentralized decision-making remain strongly correlated with reported innovations, and the 
magnitudes of these coefficients are largely unchanged.  The effect of incentive pay is also similar 
to that found in the initial estimation, but the marginal effect is slightly larger and more 
significant.  The interaction of decentralization and incentive pay remains strong and negative.  
Several other coefficients change in size and significance, suggesting that they were previously 
biased due to their relationship with the endogenous regressor.  The size of the establishment is no 
longer significant at the 5% level in the three probit estimations, and even negatively affects the 
number of innovation types.  Seasonal peaks become insignificant in this model.  The vacancy rate 
is now significant only at the 10% level in the probit estimations.
10
As a further step to eliminate potential endogeneity, we control for whether the 
establishment reported any of the four innovation types in 1999.  Unobservable establishment 
characteristics that affect innovative behavior are approximately held fixed in the 1999 measures 
of innovation.  Table 7 shows that year 1999 innovations strongly predict current innovations, 
especially those that are of the same type, i.e. product or process.  The effects of work 
organization on innovation remain qualitatively the same.  Information-sharing is the strongest 
positive predictor of innovations, although the size of the effect is somewhat smaller in this 
estimation.  Decentralized decision making is also positive and statistically significant for both the 
number and types of innovations.  The effects of most of the other predictors remain the same. 
                                                 
10 Further concerns about the endogeneity of the vacancy rate led us to attempt a specification in which we replaced 
the establishment’s own vacancy rate with an industry-averaged vacancy rate.  This did not change the results 
significantly. 
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Finally, the longitudinal nature of the data enables us to test for endogeneity by including 
establishment fixed effects to the model in equation (2).  Here, effects are identified for those 
establishments that change workplace organization between 1999 and 2001.  This is a noisy source 
of variation, much of which probably comes from small differences in workplace practices, 
interpretation of the survey question, or reporting mistakes.  Furthermore, changes in 
organizational practices would not usually immediately yield changes in innovative activity.  
Although this is not our preferred specification, we report the results nonetheless as one control 
for endogeneity.   
Table 8 reports the results of this estimation.  In the fixed effects logit models, 
establishments that adopt information-sharing techniques are much more likely to report 
innovations.  Although this might be true by definition for process innovations if the respondent 
interprets changes in work organization as a process innovation, the result also holds up, and is 
even larger, in the product innovation specification.  Although size and union presence were 
statistically insignificant in the pooled estimations, the effects are large and significant in this 
model.  A given establishment is more likely to report innovations in periods when it is larger, and 
less likely to report innovations in periods when it has more union coverage.  Those 
establishments whose demand becomes more volatile by becoming seasonal or by having an 
increased vacancy rate are more likely to innovate.  The overall explanatory power of these 
estimations is quite low, confirming that our source of variation is noisy.  Our aim here, however, 
is not to fully explain innovative behavior, but rather to confirm the relationship between 




We use the Canadian WES data to identify whether an establishment is decentralized or 
centralized, based on the extent of worker participation in decision making in the establishment.  
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We further measure whether or not the establishment employs information-sharing techniques to 
transfer information to and from employees.  We theorize that information-sharing and 
decentralization are two alternate methods of bridging the gap between information vital to 
innovative activity and the authority to act on such information.  Our theory suggests that 
incentive pay would make either method more effective.   
We test whether there is a relationship between decentralization, information-sharing, or 
incentive pay and innovation, controlling for a number of establishment characteristics like 
industry, establishment size, degree of competition, non-profit status, and demand volatility.  
Information-sharing is strongly and positively related to innovation.  Decentralized decision 
making also has a positive, though weaker, relationship to innovation.  Incentive pay is only 
weakly related to innovation and, surprisingly, the interaction of incentive pay with decision rights 
has a negative coefficient.  While we cannot be certain that this relationship is causal, we have 
looked for evidence of reverse causality and used several different techniques to control for 
potential endogeneity.  We find a consistently strong predictive effect of workplace organizational 
structure on innovation. 
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Table 1. Percent of establishments in the WES reporting innovations 
  1999 2000 2001 2002
New product or service  44.17  31.56  40.07  29.10 
Improved product or service  53.29  43.61  46.00  33.52 
New  process  37.26 31.12 32.83 20.60 
Improved  process  45.55 37.76 37.39 28.14 
Any  innovation  63.0 54.1 57.3 45.3 
Number of observations  4123  4021  4089  3940 
Notes: All estimates are calculated using probability weights.  Sample restricted to those establishments with more 
than 10 employees. 
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Table 2.  Workplace characteristics in 1999 WES 
  Mean
Organizational type:   
Decentralized decision rights  .420 
Information sharing  .320 
Individual incentive pay plan (yes = 1)  .422 
Centralized, without incentive pay or 
information sharing 
.279 
   
Industry:  
Forestry, mining, oil and gas extraction  .015 
Labor-intensive tertiary manufacturing  .049 
Primary product manufacturing  .025 
Secondary product manufacturing  .031 
Capital-intensive tertiary manufacturing  .053 
Construction .051 
Transportation, warehousing, wholesale trade  .133 
Communication and other utilities  .021 
Retail trade and consumer services  .288 
Finance and insurance  .072 
Real estate, rental and leasing operations  .015 
Business services  .110 
Education and health services  .105 
Information and cultural industries  .031 
  
Other vars:   
Ln (establishment size)  3.28 
Union coverage rate  .131 
Nonprofit institution (yes = 1)  .098 
Part of multi-plant establishment  .328 
Ln (establishment age)  2.19 
Seasonal demand peaks (yes = 1)  .405 
Vacancy rate  .037 
Profit-sharing plan (yes = 1)  .151 
  
Monopoly (yes = 1)  .081 
More than twenty competitors (yes = 1)  .246 
Notes: All estimates are calculated using probability weights.  Sample 
restricted to those establishments with more than 10 employees. 
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Table 3a.  Share of establishments innovating, by industry 
  Percent 
innovating
Full sample  63.0 
Industry:  
Forestry, mining, oil and gas extraction  45.0 
Labor-intensive tertiary manufacturing  66.5 
Primary product manufacturing  62.2 
Secondary product manufacturing  71.4 
Capital-intensive tertiary manufacturing  82.8 
Construction 54.0 
Transportation, warehousing, wholesale trade  70.1 
Communication and other utilities  52.6 
Retail trade and consumer services  59.6 
Finance and insurance  73.3 
Real estate, rental and leasing operations  64.9 
Business services  62.3 
Education and health services  50.1 
Information and cultural industries  68.4 
Notes: All estimates are calculated using probability weights.  Sample 
restricted to those establishments with more than 10 employees. 
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Table 3b.  Share of establishments innovating, by 
workplace characteristics 
  Percent 
innovating
Full sample  63.0 
Decentralized decision rights  69.4 
Information sharing  75.2 
Individual incentive pay plan (yes = 1)  70.3. 
Centralized, without incentive pay or 
information sharing 
49.8 
Less than 50 employees  62.0 
50 – 99 employees  67.5 
100 – 249 employees  64.7 
At least 250 employees  74.8 
Unionized   64.7 
Non-unionized 62.6 
Nonprofit institution   47.9 
For-profit institution   64.6 
Establishment part of multi-plant firm  66.4 
Stand-alone establishment  61.3 
Establishment age less than five years  62.2 
Establishment age 5 – 14 years  64.6 
Establishment age at least 15 years  62.2 
Seasonal demand peaks   63.6 
No seasonal demand peaks  62.6 
Vacancy rate = 0  60.2 
Vacancy rate less than .03  73.8 
Vacancy rate at least .03  68.6 
Profit-sharing plan  71.3 
No profit-sharing plan  61.5 
Monopoly 57.0 
Not monopoly  63.5 
More than twenty competitors  64.4 
Under twenty competitors  62.5 
Notes: All estimates are calculated using probability weights.  Sample 
restricted to those establishments with more than 10 employees. 
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Table 4. Effect of 1999 organizational structure and establishment characteristics on 
the probability of innovation in 1999-2002 WES 
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Pseudo-R
2 .064 .083  .064  .024 
Notes: Cols. 1-3 are marginal effects of probit regressions.  Col. 4 are Tobit effects.  All are adjusted with 
probability weights and to control for clustering due to multiple observations in the same establishment, one for 
each year. 
* = p-value<.1, 
** = p<.05, 
*** = p<.01.  Each regression also includes a full set of 13 industry and 
year indicators. N = 14,594 
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Table 5.  Predictive effect of innovations on workplace organization; a test of reverse 
causality 
  Dependent variable: 2001 workplace organization type: 
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(yes = 1) 
.2104*** 
(.043)    
1999: Info-sharing  
(yes = 1)   
.1809*** 
(.045)  
1999: Incentive Pay Plan 
(yes = 1)    
.2676*** 
(.046) 
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Number of observations  3570  3501  3570 
Pseudo  R-squared  .17 .19 .25 
Coefficients shown are marginal effects of probit estimation.   Each regression also includes a full set of 13 
industry and year indicators
 .  * = p-value<.1, 
** = p<.05, 
*** = p<.01.   All are adjusted with probability weights 
and to control for clustering due to multiple observations in the same establishment, one for each year    
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Table 6. Effect of 1999 organizational structure and 1999 establishment characteristics on 
the probability of future innovation in 2000-2002 WES 
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2 .056 .082  .059  .021 
Notes: Cols. 1-3 are marginal effects of probit regressions.  Col. 4 are Tobit effects.  All are adjusted with probability 
weights and to control for clustering due to multiple observations in the same establishment, one for each year. 
* = p-
value<.1, 
** = p<.05, 
*** = p<.01.  Each regression also includes a full set of 13 industry and year indicators. N = 
10,409    
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Table 7. Effect of 1999 organizational structure and 1999 establishment characteristics on the 
probability of future innovation in 2000-2002 WES, with controls for 1999 innovations 
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2 .090 .115  .090 .035 
Notes: Cols. 1-3 are marginal effects of probit regressions.  Col. 4 are Tobit effects.  All are adjusted with probability weights 
and to control for clustering due to multiple observations in the same establishment, one for each year. 
* = p-value<.1, 
** = 
p<.05, 
*** = p<.01.  Each regression also includes a full set of 13 industry and year indicators. N = 10,409    
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Table 8. Effect of organizational structure and establishment characteristics on the 
innovations in 1999-2002 WES, with establishment fixed effects included  
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2 .008 .008  .010 .023 
Number of observations  8623  8642  8617  14594 
Notes: Cols. 1-3 are effects of fixed effects logit regressions.  Col. 4 are linear fixed effects.  
* = p-value<.1, 
** = 
p<.05, 
*** = p<.01.  Each regression also includes a full set of 13 industry and indicators. N = 10,409    
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Table A1.  Workplace organization and components in 1999 
WES, by whether or not innovating 
  Fraction 
innovating
Decentralized decision-making   
     Decide on daily planning of individual work  .625 
     Decide on weekly planning of individual work  .629 
     Decide on follow-up of results  .697 
     Decide on customer relations  .680 
     Decide on quality control  .688 
     Decide on purchase of necessary supplies  .680 
     Decide on machine/equipment maintenance  .662 
     Decide on setting staffing levels  .512 
     Decide on filling vacancies  .851 
     Decide on training  .667 
     Decide on choice of production technology  .727 
     Decide on product/service development  .708 
Information –sharing   
     Suggest  .774 
     Info-sharing  .763 
     Committee  .755 
Notes: All estimates are calculated using probability weights.  Sample 
restricted to those establishments with more than 10 employees. 
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Finance and insurance  0.44 0.31  0.38  0.26 
Capital-intensive tertiary manufacturing (printing, 
machinery manufacturing, computer and electronics, 
lighting, transportation equipment) 
0.37 0.20  0.33  0.22 
Labor-intensive tertiary manufacturing (food, 
beverage, tobacco, textile, apparel, leather, furniture, 
and miscellaneous manufacturing) 
0.37 0.15  0.28  0.15 
Information and culture  0.32 0.14  0.29  0.15 
Secondary product manufacturing (chemicals; plastic, 
rubber, and fabricated metal products)  0.34 0.14  0.23  0.15 
Primary product manufacturing (wood, paper, 
petroleum, coal, metal, and nonmetallic mineral 
products) 
0.21 0.09  0.22  0.15 
Retail trade and consumer services  0.33 0.07  0.25  0.02 
Transportation, storage and wholesale trade  0.28 0.08  0.21  0.04 
Business services  0.23 0.07  0.19  0.07 
Communication and other utilities  0.23 0.09  0.16  0.07 
Education and health services  0.20 0.06  0.14  0.01 
Real estate, rental, and leasing operations  0.14  -0.01  0.12  -0.03 
Construction 0.02  -0.07  0.01  -0.09 
              
year 2000  -0.05 -0.04  -0.06  -0.05 
year 2001  -0.02 -0.04  -0.02  -0.05 
year 2002  -0.10 -0.11  -0.13  -0.11 
Notes: estimates shown are marginal effects of probit regressions, which are adjusted with probability weights and to 
control for clustering due to multiple observations in the same establishment, one for each year.  The omitted 
reference industry is extraction industries (forestry, mining, oil) and the omitted reference year is 1999. 
Figures in bold are statistically significant at p<.05. 
 
 